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FRANZ VON KUTSCHERA 
REASONS AND CAUSES OF BELIEFS 
I do not speak about Belief but only of beliefs of the common variety. My talk 
takes me across a very wide and controversial field. It cannot, therefore, be 
more than a brief statement on the most important points involved.1 My theses 
will sound rather apodictical, since I leave out most of the arguments. I shall 
discuss the following questions: Do beliefs have reasons? Do they have cau-
ses? Are rational explanations of beliefs compatible with causal ones? I shall 
close with some remarks on the hypothesis of a causal determination of men-
tal events. 
1. DO BELIEFS HAVE REASONS? 
For an answer we first have to agree on an understanding of beliefs and rea-
sons. 
1J What are beliefs? 
Two preliminary remarks: We first have to distinguish between the state of 
affairs that somebody (at a certain time) believes that a certain proposition 
holds and this proposition believed by him. In what follows we are concerned 
with beliefs in the first sense, with beliefs as states of believing, not with what 
is believed. Secondly, "belief is a common label for convictions, surmises, 
suppositions, expectations, etc. We say that a person X believes that a state of 
affairs, p, obtains only if p has a higher (subjective) probability for X than non-
p, but different concepts of believing demand different differences between 
these two probabilities. For the sake of simplicity I shall always think of prob-
ability one for p, i.e. I shall only speak of convictions. Some people presuppo-
se that probability one is almost never conferred to non-tautological 
propositions, and that certainly has its advantages in many contexts. But 
almost nothing I shall say depends on convictions having exactly probability 
one. Only at one point I shall use standard epistemic logic for beliefs which 
results from probability theory by restriction to probability one. Otherwise 
taking beliefs as convictions serves only to avoid cumbersome distinctions. 
Now, for our topic the essential question is this: Is assuming an activity, are 
we free to assume one thing or another, or is it a process, something that just 
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happens to us? In other words: Do beliefs arise from choices or are they just 
passively conceived? Impressions are passive. By an impression I do not mean 
a sensation, but what I have when it appears to me that something is the case. 
I cannot determine, whether I shall have or go on having a certain impression. 
My impressions are something given for me. I can influence them only indi-
rectly by closing my eyes, for instance, or by looking somewhere else. 
Judgments, on the other hand, are acts. Not only uttering a judgment is an act, 
but judgments are something we accept or reject or refrain from making, that 
we form, arrive at, suspend or revise. Beliefs seem to be located somewhere 
between impressions and judgments. On the one hand I also form or modify 
my beliefs, on the other hand many of them just obtrude themselves upon me; 
I cannot believe anything I want to. Often our beliefs follow our impressions: 
If it seems to me, as if my tobacco pouch is lying on the table, that's what I 
believe, normally. The Stoics said that the step from an impression, that some-
thing is the case, to the judgment, that it is indeed the case, is an act of assent 
which they termed synkatathesis (adsensio), a decision to accept the impres-
sion as correct Now in judgments we express our beliefs. Therefore we cannot 
say that in our judgments we are free, but not in our beliefs. Beliefs, then, are 
neither impressions nor determined by them, but are also formed by an act of 
assent, of synkatathesis. We often accept that things are as they appear to us, 
but not always. The oar seems to bend where it dips into the water, but we still 
believe it to be straight Knowledge, furthermore, is true and well-founded 
belief. Coming to know, doubtlessly, is an activity - we have to observe, argue 
or acquire informations. This activity does not concern truth, but only arriving 
at the belief. Of course the activity in forming beliefs often is not very pro-
nounced, as for instance in the case of simple observations. But it becomes 
apparent when we have to weigh the evidences or have to sort out a lot of 
informations. The belief, for instance, that there are only four basic forces in 
physics certainly does not just obtrude itself upon us. 
There are some objections against understanding beliefs as products of an 
activity. I shall try to respond to some of them briefly. We certainly cannot 
believe what we want to believe. I cannot, for instance, just convince myself 
that I am Chancelor Kohl. But I cannot run as quickly as I want to, either, or 
along the ceiling, and yet running is clearly an activity. That our capacity to do 
something is restricted is no argument that it is not an activity, that in procee-
ding with it we are not free. In our judgments we doubtlessly have a certain 
latitude, and therefore also in our beliefs. What we have to believe is general-
ly what we have to believe if we want to observe criteria of rationality or hold 
on to fundamental convictions. 
For a piece of behavior to be a free action of the agent it is necessary that he 
could have done otherwise, but it is not necessary that it be premeditated. 
Assuming an act of assent for beliefs does not then imply that coming to belie-
ve something always is preceeded by considerations. Sometimes it is, but 
often not 
It might be said, furthermore, that the assumption of acts of synkatathesis is 
superfluous, at least if we do not talk about convictions, but about probabili-
ties. Just as convictions probability assignments have to be coherent, however, 
and coherence is not something which results from the impressions themsel-
ves; it has to be construed and there are mostly different ways to do that. 
Lastly it is not a consequence of the Stoic thesis that we can always clearly 
distinguish between impressions and beliefs. Since impressions are not just 
sensations but appearances about what is the case, they are not independent of 
our beliefs, but theory-laden and interpreted in the light of proceeding assump-
tions. Some optical illusions, for instance, vanish as soon as we recognize 
them as such. The immediately given as the raw material of our observations, 
still free from hypothetical elements and interpretations, does not exist. The 
difference between impressions and assumptions is often only gradual, but 
nevertheless relevant, just as the judge's request that the witness restrict him-
self to facts and leave aside his interpretations of them. 
In what follows, I shall thus proceed from the view that arriving at beliefs 
is an activity. 
12 Reasons for beliefs 
Reasons are what we normally refer to when we explain actions. A rational 
explanation of an action of Joe gives an answer to the question why he acted 
the way he did. It states aims, interests or, generally, preferences of Joe and 
beliefs or expectations he had, and shows that, in the light of these beliefs, the 
action was indicated for attaining these ends, or, put more abstractly, that it 
was rational in the sense of decision theory. The presupposition is that Joe, in 
the situation referred to, had alternatives, so that he could have done otherwi-
se. Why he didn't get up from a chair he was chained to, is not a question that 
admits of an answer by rational explanation. 
A rational explanation of a belief held by Joe is an answer to the question, 
why he holds i t Why does he believe that it will rain soon? Because he has 
seen dark clouds approaching. Why does he belief that it was Mr. Smith that 
killed Mrs. Brown? Because he saw him entering her flat with a knife, or 
because someone told him that the fingerprints on the weapon were Mr. 
Smith's. As reasons for beliefs we thus give observations, informations or 
other beliefs. In general we might say: Reasons for beliefs are other beliefs, 
that support them. Impressions are grounds for beliefs only if we take them to 
be reliable, i.e. only mediately. 
If the adoption of beliefs is to be amenable to rational explanation, there 
have to be relevant interests and preferences, too. So what constitutes the utili-
ty of a belief for somebody? Karl Popper has discussed this question for theo-
ries and has pointed out that we are interested in true, informative and testable 
theories - testability is a prerequisite for ascertaining empirical truth - , as well 
as in simple, comprehensive and unified descriptions of the phenomena. We 
might simply say that we are interested in true beliefs, that belief is truth-
oriented. Since truth is not something we can grasp directly, independently of 
our assumptions, the only way to reliable beliefs is to proportion them to the 
evidence. The bias for grounded convictions is common to us all, and therefo-
re preferences for beliefs have to be mentioned only if they are not just ratio-
nal ones. If I trust somebody, for instance, this may explain why I do not 
believe him guilty although there are good reasons to do so, reasons that others 
accept as conclusive. I may still believe in his innocence, not because I have 
assigned a higher a priori probability to it than they did, but because of perso-
nal commitments or emotional ties. 
For beliefs to have reasons and be amenable to rational explanation they 
have to arise from decisions, then. Reasons, after all, are something the agent 
has for doing as he did, something that guides his decision. Inversely, if beliefs 
are adopted by acts of assent, they are in principle amenable to rational expla-
nations; there is such an explanation if the agent had good reasons to do as he 
did. 
Finally I want to emphasize, that a rational explanation of an act only shows 
it to be rational in the subjective sense, in the light of the preferences and 
expectations of the agent himself, but not in an objective sense. What he does 
may be subjectively rational but in fact not suited to his interests, or his aims 
may be devoid of any real value. In the same way a person's belief may be sub-
jectively rational as seen against the background of his previous assumptions, 
but quite irrational according to scientific standards. 
I DO BELIEFS HAVE CAUSES? 
2.1 What are causes? 
The answer to the question whether beliefs have causes depends on the con-
cept of causation employed There are essentially three theories of causation 
that all take their departure from Hume: Regularity theory, probability theory 
of causation (P. Suppes) and counterfactual analyses (D. Lewis), and of the 
latter two there are objective and subjective versions - in the former case 
objective and subjective probabilities can be employed, and in the last one 
objective or epistemic interpretations of conditionals. These theories may con-
fer different truth values upon singular causal statements. They all have their 
shortcomings. This may be taken as an indication that our talk of causes and 
effects in everyday life and in science does not follow one general criterion, 
that there is not just one concept of causation but several ones exhibiting only 
a certain family resemblance. 
To get an answer to our question we have to commit ourselves to one con-
cept, however, and I shall choose the one I have developed in my paper 
"Causation" (1993a). There I explicate the following notion of causation: An 
event E causes another event E \ if the occurence of E' was not guaranteed until 
E occurred. Before E actually happened it was, then, still possible that E' 
would not occur, but from E's beginning it was necessary that E' would occur 
if E would. The necessity referred to is neither a logical nor a nomological 
necessity but a timedependent one. In a world it is necessary at a time t, that 
the event E' occurs, if E* occurs, no matter what turn the history of the world 
will take after L 
The frame of the analysis of this causal relation are branching worlds that 
form treelike universes. A typical case of causation is shown by the following 
section of such a tree: 
w3 w4 w5 
E occurs in the interval [t, t+1] in w3 to w6, E* occurs in these worlds as well 
as in wl in the interval [t+1, t+2]. In w4 E causes E \ since in t it is still possi-
ble that E' will not occur (see w2), but in t it is necessary that E* will occur if E 
does. 
I think that this concept of causation corresponds to an important and fre-
quently employed notion of cause, but it should be emphasized that there are 
some points in which it radically departs from other conceptions. In determini-
stic, unbranching worlds there are no causes, for instance, effects are never 
causes, since causes are only events that are not determined (i.e. necessary) 
from their beginning, while effects are always determined from the start. 
Hence there are no causal chains. This concept is related to that proposed by 
Georg Henrik v. Wright in "Causality and Determinism" (1974). Since I 
employ this notion of causation in what follows, it should be kept in mind, that 
my assertions depend on its specific properties. Causes, according to this no-
tion, are typically chance events or actions, or events that contain them. 
2.2 Do beliefs have causes? 
A positive answer would have to come from the brain sciences, first of all, but 
as far as I see -1 certainly don't see very far in these matters - they have little 
to offer in this line yet. So we have to look for everyday examples and argue 
on the phenomenological level. What we are interested in%are, first of all, 
beliefs that cannot be rationally explained; the compatibility of rational and 
causal explanations will be our next topic. 
Now I already said that a rational explanation of beliefs does not imply that 
they be rational in an objective sense. Unreasoned or unreasonable beliefs are 
non-starters in the present context, therefore. What remains are cases like 
these: 
1) A child is afraid of dogs. Its fear will be bound up with the belief that dogs 
are snappish and impredictable. This conviction may have no reasons: The 
child has never been bitten by a dog, nor has it seen a dog bite someone else. 
Its parents assure it that dogs are quite harmless. There is a psychological 
explanation of this phenomenon as a projection of the Childs fear of its father 
on animals. That sounds rather absurd, but still one would say in this case that 
the conviction cannot be explained rationally, but must have psychological 
causes. 
2) A schizophrenic believes himself to be persecuted by dark powers. He can 
give no specific reasons for his conviction, and we should therefore say that it 
is an effect of his disease. 
These are clearly border-line cases of beliefs. We are inclined not to call 
them beliefs but delusions. I don't want to deny that there are beliefs which 
can only be explained causally - the distinction between beliefs and delusions 
is terminologically not very well defined - but at least they seem to be atypi-
cal cases. 
3. ARE RATIONAL EXPLANATIONS OF BELIEFS 
COMPATIBLE WITH CAUSAL ONES? 
But cannot the same belief be explained rationally as well as causally? 
According to my notion of causation the answer must be in the negative: A 
rational explanation of a piece of behavior is only possible if the agent could 
have done otherwise. Only if he had alternatives we can attribute reasons to 
him for doing what he did. Whatever his interests or beliefs are, they would 
have been ineffective had he had no choice. If the action arose from a decision, 
however, it was not determined from its beginning and therefore it cannot be 
an effect of a precedent cause. So what can be explained rationally cannot also 
be explained causally. Inversely, effects are no possible explananda of rational 
explanations because they are not actions. What can be explained causally, 
then, cannot be explained rationally. 
But cannot reasons themselves be causes? Can we not say: The fact that 
somebody has certain interests and convictions is the cause of his doing this or 
that? According to the concept of causation I am using here that is impossible 
even if we ignore the fact that interests and beliefs are not events. Even from 
the point of regularity theory we cannot accept reasons as causes. For causes 
are events at the beginning of which we can say: If they occur the effect will 
also occur. We cannot maintain, however, that if somebody has certain inter-
ests and expectations he will act in a certain way. We just don't always act 
rationally. If a sudden squall blows John's hat off we can explain his running 
after it by his desire not to lose iL But at the moment the hat is blown off his 
head we cannot say that John, since he does not want to lose it, will run after 
his hat he may well refrain from doing so since he does not want to make him-
self conspicuous. Causal explanations can be turned into predictions, rational 
ones not. Neither are causes reasons. A reason for adopting a belief is some-
thing that speaks for its truth. A cause for a belief, on the other hand, is neutral 
to its truth. In fact, if we recognize a belief as an effect of psychological or 
neurological causes that would not only be no reason to think it correct, but 
rather make us doubt iL Moreover, I myself can recognize a cause of a belief I 
presently hold only if I see it also as a reason for that belief: If I believe that an 
event E causes me to believe that A, I believe that E implies my belief that A. 
Now it is a theorem of epistemic logic that I believe my present beliefs to be 
true. Therefore I believe that E implies A, and hence my belief in E, which I 
must have if I take E to be a cause, is a reason for me to believe A. 
Of course it is possible sometimes to show that the behavior of a person 
which can be causally explained, corresponds to his purposes, but that is no 
rational explanation of his behavior and does not show its purposiveness. If, 
for instance, somebody is thrown against a door in a train that suddenly slows 
down and it opens, just as he wanted it to do, that does not give us a rational 
explanation of an action. 
4. MENTAL DETERMINISM 
I have said: If the adoption of a belief is an act which on the phenomenological 
level at least is mostly the case it is amenable to rational, but not to causal 
explanation, and as far as beliefs have causes they are not results of decisions 
and therefore cannot be explained rationally. This still leaves open the question 
whether believing and thinking really are free activities* or not Do we, then, 
have to assume determinisms, the validity of the causal principle in the realm 
of the mental, or should we reject it? 
As Kant has shown the question of universal determinism cannot be defini-
tively decided. We cannot prove that every event has a cause, simply because 
we cannot produce an explanation for every event. If we produce such an 
explanation that is a new event for which we then have to find a cause, and so 
on. On the other hand, we cannot prove that a certain event has no cause, 
either, for we can never exclude that in the future we shall find a cause for i t 
We can only say that in view of the statistical character of the fundamental 
laws of physics universal determinism is probably wrong, or that a deter-
minism of the mental should become probable, if the brain sciences should 
one day provide theories that allow for detailed explanations of mental pheno-
mena of all kinds. 
A complete determination of human behavior, especially of mental be-
havior is, then, at least logically possible, but I maintain that we cannot consi-
stently believe that it holds. My arguments are not new and I cannot go into 
them here. One is the wellknown Gödei argument. It is agreed that it is not 
conclusive in the form it has been defended by J. R. Lucas. But it is correct in 
a version corresponding roughly to that of Paul Benacerraf in his paper "God, 
the devil, and Gödel" (1967), which does not attempt to show that man is not 
a machine, but that if he were a machine he could not recognize the fact. It 
may also be argued that we cannot possess a complete theory of human beha-
vior. Such a theory would also have to describe how we understand and apply 
it, and that means that it would have to contain something like its own meta-
theory; the metatheory, however, is always richer than the theory itself. So 
there may be a theory describing and explaining human behavior down to its 
last details, but it is not a theory, which we can hold. 
More important than such formal arguments, however, is to realize that our 
normal conceptions of, and with them our normal language about human 
behavior, are essentially bound up with the presupposition of freedom - free-
dom in the normal sense, not just in that of determinists like Hobbes and 
Spinoza, which Kant termed "die Freiheit des Bratenwenders", a "Bratenwen-
der" being a grill operated by a clockwork. I we were to conceive of ourselves 
and others as automata, that would not only necessitate a far reaching revision 
of our conceptions of acting and thinking, but we would also have to develop 
a radically different language for expressing these notions. Presently at least, 
that is an Utopian project in the sense of determinism even an absurd one, since 
according to it we just have to talk the way we do. 
I want to illustrate this contention by two remarks: Communication by 
language presupposes freedom. According to Paul Grice a speech act is not 
only an intentional act but the speaker also performs it with the aim that his 
audience will recognize certain of his intentions. And the audience, in turn, 
understand the speech act only if they recognize the speaker's intentions. If 
speaking were a causally determined behavior, it would not be determined by 
intentions and could not, then, be recognized as intentional, still less as an 
attempt of the speaker to indicate his intentions. That, essentially, is an objec-
tion John Searle has raised in his book "Minds, Brains, and Science" (1984) 
against Alan Turing's thesis, that computers can talk. Searle insists that their 
outputs of symbols, though meaningful in our language, cannot be taken as a 
communicative acts, i.e. as expressions of intentions. 
Knowledge also presupposes freedom. It consists in judgments which, as 
we have seen, are free acts. The norms of rationality, furthermore, that we try 
to satisfy in our argumentations, make sense only if we can conform to them, 
but do not do so automatically. Finally, the confidence we have in our under-
standing rests on the conviction that we are able to test our assumptions and 
revise them, that we do not just think the way we have to, but can take account 
of evidences and reasons that speak for or against the truth of our assump-
tions.2 
All this, as I have said, can only be short hints, of course, but a detailed dis-
cussion would require a separate talk for each of the arguments I mentioned. 
NOTES 
For a more detailed discussion cf. Kutschera (1993), especially § 3.4. 
For an argument against the compatibility of a very weak form of materialism with what we • 
must be able to believe about the physical world in order to understand it cf. Kutschera (1994). 
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